Tax reform in transition economies and its impact on economic performance by Walenczykowski, Slawomir P.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2002-06
Tax reform in transition economies and its impact on
economic performance
Walenczykowski, Slawomir P.





Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
TAX REFORM IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES AND ITS




Thesis Advisor: Robert M. McNab
Associate Advisor: William R. Gates

iREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No.0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per re-
sponse, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering
and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate
for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188)
Washington DC 20503.




REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: TAX REFORM IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES AND
ITS IMPACT ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR (S) Slawomir P. Walenczykowski









11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not
reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
Starting with Hungary in 1984 and followed thereafter by other countries in
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, the process of transition from centrally
planned socialist economies to market oriented economies has been characterized by un-
even performance. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovenia have each made sig-
nificant progress in economic, political and judicial reforms while Russia, and many
other countries of the former Soviet Union have lagged in implementing broad economic
and political reforms and their economic performance has suffered as a result. Other
countries from Central and Eastern Europe are placed between those two extremes.
The objective of my thesis is to examine the development of effective and effi-
cient tax systems in the transitional economies and the influence of tax reform on
economic performance. Without an effective tax system the state is unable to collect
revenues for financing government expenditures; “gray zones” develop in the economy,
which discourage investors and private entrepreneurs; and the rule of law diminishes
over time. Without systemic tax reform economic growth will slow or decline; the so-
cial costs of reform will increase; and political pressure will mount to slow or re-
verse reforms.
14. SUBJECT TERMS: Tax Reform, Tax Administration, Transition


















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
ii
iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
TAX REFORM IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
AND ITS IMPACT ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE.
Slawomir P. Walenczykowski
First Lieutenant, Polish Army
B.S., Wroclaw Military Academy, 1995
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE




Author: Slawomir P. Walenczykowski
Approved by: Robert M. McNab, Thesis Advisor
William R. Gates, Associate Advisor
Douglas A. Brook,




Starting with Hungary in 1984 and followed thereafter
by other countries in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Un-
ion, the process of transition from centrally planned so-
cialist economies to market oriented economies has been
characterized by uneven performance. Poland, Hungary, Czech
Republic, and Slovenia have each made significant progress
in economic, political and judicial reforms while Russia,
and many other countries of the former Soviet Union have
lagged in implementing broad economic and political reforms
and their economic performance has suffered as a result.
Other countries from Central and Eastern Europe are placed
between those two extremes.
The objective of my thesis is to examine the develop-
ment of effective and efficient tax systems in the transi-
tional economies and the influence of tax reform on eco-
nomic performance. We believe, a priori, that the develop-
ment of a modern tax system is a crucial element in the
transition process. Without an effective tax system the
state is unable to collect revenues for financing govern-
ment expenditures; “gray zones” develop in the economy,
which discourage investors and private entrepreneurs; and
the rule of law diminishes over time. Without systemic tax
reform, we argue, economic growth will slow or decline; the
social costs of reform will increase; and political pres-
sure will mount to slow or reverse reforms. In this case,
the government may come to crossroads where the option to
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The objective of my thesis is to examine the develop-
ment of effective and efficient tax systems in the transi-
tional economies and the influence of tax reform on eco-
nomic performance. Through a review of literature and ac-
cessible databases (EBRD, OESD and World Bank), we will re-
view and summarize the first decade of transition experi-
ence in tax reform paying special attention on the scope,
pace and stability of the process. We will then attempt to
evaluate impact of different approaches of tax reform on
economic performance. To examine the influence of tax re-
form we will construct an index of tax reform effectiveness
for 15 Central and Eastern European countries in transi-
tion. The purpose of the index is to investigate how impor-
tant tax reform was during the first decade of the transi-
tion process. The index, while subjective, can provide some
insight into the impact of tax reform on the process of
economic transition.
We believe that by comparing tax reform index with
other economic development indicators we will find that ef-
fective tax reform has positive impact on the economic per-
formance of the countries in transition. Our hypothesis is
that the economic performance of advanced tax reformers is
superior relative to slow reformers. Based on an analysis
we will provide policy recommendations on the scope and





The legacy of central planning continues to haunt the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former So-
viet Union. While tremendous progress has been made in the
first decade of transition in liberalizing markets and ra-
tionalizing economic policies, tax system reform continues
to lag behind other reforms (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab,
2001). Delay in tax system reform decreases the govern-
ment’s ability to generate sufficient resources, signifi-
cantly slowing down development in other areas of transi-
tional reforms. Whether the poor progress of the countries
in transition (CIT) tax system reform has hindered economic
performance is largely an unanswered question.
The main goal of this thesis is to examine the devel-
opment of effective and efficient tax systems in the tran-
sitional economies. We examine the links between fiscal
policy and economic transformation to ascertain the influ-
ence of the tax reform on economic performance. In conclu-
sion, we define objectives for tax reforms and policy rec-
ommendations on the pace and scope of the reform1.
To examine the influence of tax reform on economic
growth, we construct an index of tax reform effectiveness
for the CITs. The purpose of the index is to investigate
the importance of tax reform during the first decade of the
transition process. The index, while subjective, can pro-
1 While the main focus of this thesis is on transition process in
Central and Eastern European countries, as well as on former Soviet Un-
ion republics, we are aware of Southeastern Asian countries where that
process is also ongoing. Comparisons between those two sets of coun-
tries are beyond the scope of this thesis.
2vide some insight into the impact of tax reform on the
process of economic transition. Our hypothesis is that the
economic performance of the advanced tax reformers is supe-
rior relative to that of the slow reformers. When comparing
the tax reform index with other economic development indi-
cators, we find that effective tax reform positively influ-
ences economic performance in the CITs.
B. MOTIVATION OF THESIS
Starting with Hungary in 1984 and followed thereafter
by other countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, the process of transition from centrally planned so-
cialist economies to market-oriented economies has been
characterized by uneven performance. Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, and Slovenia have each made significant
progress in economic, political, and judicial reforms,
while Russia, and many other countries of the former Soviet
Union, have lagged in implementing broad economic and po-
litical reforms. Other countries from Central and Eastern
Europe can be placed between those two extremes.
While economic transformation has impacted every sec-
tor of the economy, the process was not as smooth and rapid
as was initially expected, resulting in recession and se-
vere economic dislocations in CITs. Several arguments have
emerged about which policies would have been most effective
in reestablishing economic growth. The Central European
countries, encouraged by International Monetary Fund (IMF)
policy, preferred rapid economic liberalization; whereas,
in countries where former Communist leaders remained in
3power, reforms have been slower2 (de Melo, Denizer & Gelb,
1996).
We believe, a priori, that the development of a modern
tax system is a crucial element in the transition process.
Taxpayers and budget beneficiaries expect stability in
their fiscal systems. Tax system distortions can undermine
the state’s trustworthiness, create budget deficits, and
inflation and promote capital flight. Without an effective
tax system, the state is unable to collect revenues for fi-
nancing government expenditures, especially to support
other economic reforms (Gandhi, Mihaljek, 1995); and “gray
zones” develop in the economy, discouraging investors and
private entrepreneurs causing the rule of law to diminish
over time. Without systemic tax reform, we argue, economic
growth will slow or decline; the social costs of reform
will increase; and political pressure will mount to slow or
reverse reforms. In this case, the government may come to
crossroads where the option to abandon or slow down reform
is very tempting. In such conditions, new initiatives will
be considered as politically risky and economically uncer-
tain.
C. STRUCTURE OF THESIS
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In
Chapter II we briefly examine the tax system in centrally
planned economies, focusing on the environment in which tax
reforms had to take place. In Chapter III we evaluate the
constraints inherited from a previous system, since many
problems of tax reform have a direct relation to the past.
2 Examples are the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
4Additionally in that Chapter we consider two possible
strategies faced by policy-makers in reforming the tax sys-
tem. In Chapter IV we analyze the current tax systems in
CITs and attempt to assess the impact of different ap-
proaches to the tax reform on the economic performance of
transitional economies. In Chapter V we summarize the les-
sons from the tax reform in CITs. Based on the analysis we
provide policy recommendations on the scope and pace of the
tax reform in developing and transitional countries.
5II – REVIEW OF THE TAX SYSTEM IN CENTRALLY PLANNED
ECONOMIES
A. INTRODUCTION
After the breakdown of the Soviet system, the coun-
tries in Central and Eastern Europe were left with the
heritage of a socialist state, including internal distor-
tions and external imbalances. Each of the countries in
transition (CITs) had to recover from a centrally planned
economy. One of the biggest challenges faced by the transi-
tioning countries was reform of their tax systems. In fact,
we argue, no tax system existed in the normal sense. More-
over, the old tax systems were insufficient in the rapidly
changing environment at the beginning of transition (Gandhi
& Mihajlek, 1995).
Two major periods can be identified for taxation sys-
tems in centrally planned economies. We focus on the period
named by Kornai (1992) as “reformed socialism”. We believe
that this focus is justified due to the proliferation of
reforms at the beginning of the transition period. All so-
cialist countries had been at different stages of economic
reforms. Nevertheless, throughout the chapter we compare,
when relevant and possible, the role of specific taxes in
different periods of socialist taxation.
The objective of the chapter is to evaluate the envi-
ronment in which the transitional reforms had to take
place. We first examine the history of taxation in the cen-
trally planned economies. We believe that this discussion
is important because many Central and Eastern European
countries had similar tax systems at the beginning of tran-
sition (Ebrill & Havrylyshyn, 1999). While each tax system
6had its own, unique characteristics, they were, in fact,
derivatives on the Soviet Union tax system. We then evalu-
ate the tax structure in centrally planned economies focus-
ing on the role of different taxes in the socialist budget.
In the last section of the chapter, we analyze role of the
tax administration in the centrally planned economy.
B. HISTORY OF TAXATION IN CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES
Two major periods are distinguishable for tax systems
in centrally planned economies (Wanless, 1985; Martinez-
Vazquez & McNab, 2001). For each of these periods, taxation
played a slightly different role. In the first period, de-
scribed by Wanless (1985) as the “command economy,” the
primary role of taxation was to collect funds for financing
the non-productive sectors and dividing national income
among all economic segments. The private sector was mar-
ginal or non-existent in some cases and prices were admin-
istratively set, thus taxation could not be the main allo-
cative force.3 Moreover, taxes could not realistically af-
fect market prices due to absence of a market in centrally
planned economies. In such circumstances, taxation was not
an instrument of social policy, but merely served to col-
lect revenues for the state budget. The socialist state
used other tools to influence retail prices and the struc-
ture of consumer demand.4
In the “command system”, budget revenue came from two
primary sources: sales taxes (mainly the turnover tax on
3 The term “allocative force” defines an instrument of allocating re-
sources from the private sector to the governmental sector, providing
the government means to conduct a limited range of economic functions.
4 In a socialist centrally planned economy, the state had more exten-
sive control over resources than in a free market economy.
7consumption goods and services), and profits of state owned
enterprises (SOEs). The state administration did not clas-
sify revenues from SOEs as profit taxes, but rather as a
deduction of surplus product, which already belonged to the
state (Wilczynski, 1977). The state, as the owner of the
means of production and the final product, could subtract
any available resources. As a result, the profits of SOEs
were subject to marginal tax rates equal to or, in some
cases exceeding 100 percent.
The rigid “command system” created several inefficien-
cies, especially in providing incentives to the management
of SOEs. In fact, the entire period, starting in 1968 with
Hungarian reforms until the start of perestroika, was
filled by new initiatives to reform the socialist system.5
Changes in the tax system, however, were only part of
broader reforms.6 With the introduction of other, market-
oriented reforms, the tax system started to play a greater
role in the economy. New taxes were introduced, to include
capital charges (1960’s), taxes on the wage fund (payroll
tax - 1970’s) and the profit tax. As a result of these and
other reforms, the tax system started to influence produc-
tion decisions, and introduced a new system of dividing
profits between the state and the enterprise, allowing the
latter to retain part of the profit.
5 For details about those initiatives see Lavigne (1995) and Wanless
(1985)
6 In summary, they involved greater decentralization of decision-
making, greater reliance on profit incentives, and greater reduction of
administrative intervention into economy (Wanless, 1985).
8C. TAX SYSTEMS IN CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES
Tax revenues in centrally planned economies came from
the turnover, capital, payroll and profit taxes levied
mainly on SOEs.
1. The Turnover Tax
The turnover tax was a single-rate tax on SOE sales of
specific products to the retail market. The turnover tax
was introduced as an instrument of pricing policy7 and as a
means of increasing budgetary revenues. Normally, the turn-
over tax was imposed only on domestic and imported consumer
goods. Exported goods, production inputs, and materials
purchased by state bureaus were usually exempt from the
turnover tax (Wanless, 1985). In some cases, however, pro-
ducer goods were also subject to the tax, such as oil,
electricity and metalware in the USSR (Wilczynski, 1977).
The turnover tax was calculated on an ad valorem ba-
sis, as a percentage of retail prices, or on a specific ba-
sis, such as fixed amount per unit of product. The base of
taxation was usually producer prices rather than consumer
prices. With reforms of the “command economy”, responsibil-
ity for collecting the turnover tax shifted from producing
to trading entities (Wilczynski, 1977).
Turnover tax rates were extremely low, or even nega-
tive (subsidies) on basic products while exceptionally high
on luxury goods.8 Normally only a single rate existed on a
specific product, though there were some variations of that
7 The turnover tax regulated the purchasing power of consumers and
served as a residual wedge between producer and retail prices.
8 Intended as an instrument of market clearance and pricing policy,
turnover tax rates in fact did not have any input from consumer demand.
Adjustments were made infrequently and mainly to increase budget reve-
nues.
9system. In Poland, after 1973, products defined as “high-
quality” bore a reduced turnover tax rate, so the SOE could
keep a larger share of profits. This method of taxation was
introduced to improve the quality of produced goods and to
encourage product innovation.
In the centrally planned economies, turnover taxes
provided a significant portion of the state income. For ex-
ample, in 1981 turnover taxes accounted for the following
proportions of state income (Wanless, 1985):
• 31.1% in USSR
• 28.5% in Czechoslovakia
• 27.6% in Poland
• 22.5% in GDR
• 14.8% in Hungary
• 12.5% in Romania
Countries like the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland
were highly dependent on profits from turnover taxes. This
dependence meant that these countries needed to find alter-
native revenue sources at the start of the transition proc-
ess. In most cases, these CITs adopted Value Added Tax
(VAT). Countries like Hungary and Romania, less dependent
on profits from the turnover taxes, could avoid transi-
tional distortion during the process of adopting VAT.
2. Capital Charges
Capital charges were established to stimulate the ra-
tional use of capital assets and to increase efficiency in
allocating investments. Levied on fixed and working capi-
tal, capital charges were supposed to refine investment
planning and financing. In fact, however, they increased
prices in capital-intensive relative to labor-intensive in-
10
dustries. The book value of the asset was used as the tax
base; however, without clear rules on asset depreciation,
the tax liability was subject to manipulation.
In a socialist economy, investments were largely cen-
trally planned. After transforming into a “reformed social-
ism”, managers were able to use their own discretion in
making unplanned investments on a small scale (with no
strategic importance). In the absence of capital charges,
socialist economies lacked rationality in planning invest-
ments. Plan targets for investments were specified in ex-
penditure terms without accounting for the profitability of
new investments. Central planning was not able to account
for the opportunity cost of capital9 and the SOE managers
were interested in pressing planners to provide the maximum
possible amount of investment rather than focusing on the
cost of investments.
Capital charge rates depended upon the age of an as-
set, which was intended as a mechanism against over-
investments, common in socialist economies. Theoretically,
an older asset bore a lower tax rate than a new one, so an
investment would be made when the new asset was more prof-
itable than the older one. In reality, capital charges
equalized the costs of assets, because even if capital
charges declined with the age of an asset, maintenance
costs increased, and thus discouraged new investments.
Revenues from capital charges ranged from 9 to 11% of
the national income (Wanless, 1985). In some countries
capital charges were levied only on fixed assets (Poland
before 1982) or even abolished (Hungary 1980 and Poland
9
“In market economy the opportunity cost of capital is indicated by
the market rate of interest” (Wanless, 1985; p. 107)
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1982). Central planners in Hungary and Poland appeared to
recognize restraints imposed by capital charges and re-
placed them with real estate taxes.
3. The Payroll Tax
The tax on the wage fund was a general payroll tax
levied as a percentage of the wage bill. The wage fund tax
was designed to increase the effective price of labor,
thereby motivating SOE managers to use laborsaving tech-
niques. Additionally, the tax was introduced to encourage
innovation in production.
Social security contributions were paid by employers,
as a straightforward payroll tax, except for German Democ-
ratic Republic (GDR) that used both employer and employees
contributions. Those funds provided incomes for short-term
disabilities due to illness or pregnancy, as well as for
long-term disabilities due to old age and chronic ill-
nesses. In 1981, revenue generated by these taxes ranged
from 4.7% of national income in the USSR to 15.3% in Hun-
gary (Wanless, 1985). Most countries used the pay-as-you-go
system. One result of the pay-as-you-go system was that any
changes in population growth, over the long term, created
funds shortages in the pension system.
4. The Profit Tax
As noted previously, the state retained all profit
from SOE operations in the “command economy”. With the
change in philosophy to “reformed socialism”, SOEs began to
pay taxes on their net-profit. After deducting the tax por-
tion of the profit, SOEs were allowed to use the remaining
profit (if any) for financing employee’s bonuses, wage in-
creases, and for small investments. The profit tax enabled
employees to benefit from increased productivity by provid-
12
ing incentives for economic efficiency. Profit tax rates
generally varied from 50 to 60%. In some countries, how-
ever, the system’s progressive structure increased the mar-
ginal tax rate to 100%. Again, as with capital charges,
without strict rules describing deductible production
costs, total tax liability was often subject to negotia-
tion.
5. Personal Income Tax
Personal income taxes (PIT) did not play a significant
role in centrally planned economies (Wanless, 1985; Ko-
lodko, 1999). From the socialist viewpoint, it was consid-
ered undesirable to tax workers directly (Wilczynski,
1977). As a result of that policy, budgetary revenues from
direct taxation ranged from 0.6% in Czechoslovakia to 4.3%
in the GDR (in 1981, Wanless, 1985).
However, some form of personal income taxes did ex-
ist, to include taxes on earned rents, interest on savings,
and incomes from sources abroad. Other sources of revenue
from personal income taxes came from schedular taxes paid
by artists, sportsmen, and writers (with an extreme degree
of tax progression - Wilczynski, 1977). On the other hand,
earnings outside the state sector and in self-employment
were, to some extent, outside of state control (Wanless,
1985). Some countries, however, had a more complex taxation
system on personal income. For example, Poland taxed income
from a second or third job, from the private sector and
from property.
The socialist state used personal income taxes differ-
ently than free market governments. The state did not con-
sider the PIT as a tool to raise budget revenues; the PITs
were just another barrier on the growth of the private sec-
13
tor. Taxation at any given point varied substantially, pro-
viding an additional tool keeping private initiatives under
the state’s control (Kornai, 1995).
6. Tax Administration
Tax administration was generally underdeveloped in
centrally planned economies (Vazquez-Martinez & McNab,
2001; Lazear, 1995). A small number of taxpayers accounted
for almost 100% of the taxes collected. The state played a
dual role in the system as a tax collector and the owner of
corporations. Moreover, the state owned, the centralized
banking system, which allowed the tracking every transac-
tion conducted by SOEs. The problem of tax evasion under
these conditions was insignificant, despite norms that tax
liability was the product of negotiation. In this case, the
state was able to arbitrarily adjust the tax structure and
administrative procedures to meet budgetary requirements.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Under the “command economy”, in the early stage of so-
cialist’s economies, taxes provided revenues for governmen-
tal expenditures. With attempts to reform the system,
starting in Hungary in 1968 and followed by Poland in 1972
and thereafter by other Central European countries, the au-
thorities introduced new taxes, increasing their ability to
influence economic decisions. This provided input signals
for the economy. Central planning could not provide these
input signals, as opposed to the free market system.
States relied on revenues from socialized enterprises
and state-owned corporations, which provided more than 80%
of state revenue (Wanless, 1985).10 Payments from profit
10 In some countries it was almost 90%, like GDR in 1981.
14
taxes generated the most significant revenues, but that
portion varied from case to case. For example, in 1981 the
profit tax payments ranged from 20% in Poland and in the
USSR to 51% in Hungary (Wanless, 1985).
Tax systems in centrally planned economies showed sub-
stantial similarities, but details varied from country to
country.11 The scope and pace of reforms transforming “com-
mand economy” to “reformed socialism” diverged. Hungary
started its “market socialism” in 1968, on the one end of
spectrum while the USSR was considered highly centralized,
“command economy” up until 1987. Another dissimilarity
comes from different terminology used in data sources. In
reporting income items, the terms “tax”, “levy” and “pay-
ment” are often used interchangeably.
The Soviet model of taxes proved to be insufficient.
With negotiable payments, the system was far removed from
modern tax systems.12 Economies in transition needed immedi-
ate tax reform. On the other hand, these economies were an-
chored by the legacy of the previous system. Details of
that heritage are discussed in Chapter III.
11 Tax systems of South Asian centrally planned economies were also
similar to this model.
12 Which is characterized by: equity, neutrality and simplicity (Gan-
dhi & Mihaljek, 1995)
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III – LEGACY OF TAXATION IN PLANNED ECONOMY
A. INTRODUCTION
The reform of tax systems was one of the significant
challenges facing the post-socialist countries. As a result
of the turbulence during the structural transformation,
budget revenues decreased, while governments simultaneously
faced increased demands on the expenditure side of the
budget. Inevitably output fell due to macroeconomic stabi-
lization and the reallocation of resources (Fisher & Sahay,
2000). Increasing budget revenues became vital in providing
funds for financing other reforms. Consequently, reforming
tax systems became a crucial element of the transition
process.
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate con-
straints faced by countries in transition (CITs) in the be-
ginning of transitional process. We believe that the legacy
of the socialist state fundamentally influenced initial
choices and direction of tax reform during the transition
process. Some of the failures during the transition process
were the result of wrong choices; others came from indeci-
siveness and weak policy influenced by increased demands
from the population. Many of the failures in transforming
the tax systems were traceable to the past.
The tax systems inherited from the centrally planned
economies (CPEs) were unable to provide sufficient revenues
at the start of the transition process. Moreover, practices
of state interventionism, tax negotiation, tax evasion, and
an underdeveloped tax administration put the fiscal stabil-
ity of the CITs at risk.
16
This chapter starts by analyzing the constraints on
the tax systems inherited from the CPEs. The economic envi-
ronment at the beginning of the transition influenced the
choices made by policy-makers, altering transitional
strategies. We then examine two principal paradigms for re-
forming tax systems. Many failures in reforming tax systems
can be attributed to initial choices. These choices were:
immediate adoption of a pro-Western, modern tax system; or
gradually evolving the previous system, recognizing the
constraints inherited from the past within a particular
country.
B. PROBLEMS INHERITED FROM THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM
Several limitations of the previous tax system influ-
enced policy-makers in CITs. Tax systems in CPEs allowed
the state to use taxation as a tool to intervene in the
economy while imposing control over the economy. Negotiable
taxes, lack of strict, transparent rules and a relatively
small number of taxpayers resulted in a largely underdevel-
oped tax administration.13 Because private ownership was
marginal, or in some cases non-existent, state owned enter-
prises (SOEs) were main objects of taxation. In sum, these
practices resulted in decreased budget revenues and under-
mined trust in governmental institutions. At the start of
the transition process, these institutions were simply in-
sufficient for the free market. Such limitations signifi-
cantly limited the pace and scope of reforms, especially at
the beginning of the transition process.
13 The small tax administration was all that was needed in the so-
cialist economy due to the small number of taxpayers.
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1. State Interventionism
In CPEs, taxes were part of the system of control im-
posed by the state on the economy and society. The arbi-
trary use of taxation reflected the economic policy of the
state and provided revenue to support the monetary side of
the planning procedure. The state intervened in the economy
via taxation to raise budget revenue, influence economic
decisions, and give incentives for SOE management.
2. Negotiable Tax Liability
Tax systems in CPEs lacked strict rules and relation-
ships between statutory tax bases and the tax liabilities.
Negotiable tax rates were used by the socialist state for
financial control over the means of production. The state
was able to adjust the tax structure to meet its perceived
budgetary needs. Moreover, negotiable tax liabilities al-
lowed the state to protect SOEs from bankruptcy. For exam-
ple, an SOE in trouble was able to request tax relief from
state officials. These practices, nonetheless, provided an-
other disincentive for SOE management.
3. Underdeveloped Tax Administration
The underdeveloped tax administrations of the CITs
were not prepared to implement taxes in transitional condi-
tions. Centralization, administratively imposed prices, and
a lack of tax deductible costs in CPEs eased audits, allow-
ing the tax administration to focus on a relatively small
number of taxpayers. The high reliance on the state banking
system, which tracked every cash flow in the CPEs, failed
with the emergence of decentralized banking systems. To
create further problems, interventionism and negotiable tax
liabilities also affected tax administration, creating
“gray zones” in negotiations. Dependence on personal judg-
18
ment increased the possibility of bribery and inefficiency.
The popular perception of corrupted state officials under-
mined public trust in tax procedures, creating a tradition
of tax evasion.
4. Lack Of Transparency
In the CPEs, the SOEs were the main subjects under
taxation (Wilczynski, 1977; Wanless, 1985). The negotiable
tax liabilities created lack of transparency within the
system. Even the SOE management did not know what others
paid in taxes. The population was unaware of tax procedures
or even of tax burdens. Only a small percentage of citizens
paid personal income taxes based on very steep progression
rates. The lack of voluntary compliance affected the proc-
ess of implementing personal income taxes, which increased
problems with tax evasion.
5. No Influence On Income Distribution
Tax systems in centrally planned economies did not in-
fluence income distribution. Direct taxation played an in-
significant role in that process. The dominant state posi-
tion and “collective” ownership of the means of production
minimized the role of taxation in income dispersion (Ko-
lodko, 1999).
The state redistributed income in other ways. Central-
ized wages and prices created a view of equality in income
distribution. In fact, formal income equality did not re-
flect equal access to goods and services. Chronic short-
ages, especially on luxury goods, made these goods avail-
able only for a small percentage of people. In the situa-
tion of selective access to goods, connections were more
important than disposable income.
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C. REFORM STRATEGIES
The fall of socialism in Eastern and Central Europe
created new challenges for policy-makers. The task of
transforming centrally planned economies into free market
economies had no place in previous history. The pressing
economic situation forced policy-makers to make difficult
decisions without waiting for the outcomes of academic de-
bates. The initial conditions included:
• Rising pressure from the expenditure side of the
budget,
• A shrinking traditional tax base, consisting of
state owned enterprises (SOEs), due to privatiza-
tion,
• A decline in budget revenues, due to the fall in
production in restructured economies,
• And advice and recommendations from external or-
ganizations (International Monetary Fund, World
Bank).
Early proposals about transitional strategies, in sum,
can be described by two approaches.
1. Radical Approach
The “big-bang” or the “radical” approach assumed an
early and rapid move towards reforms, implementing a modern
tax system modeled on one of those functioning in the West-
ern democracies (Wolf, 1999; Gabrish & Laski, 1991). This
method was especially tempting for countries aspiring for
early access to the European Union.
The first problem faced by policy-makers favoring this
approach occurred when selecting a Western country’s system
as a model for transformation. Moreover, raging inflation,
deficits in the trade balance, and the fall in industrial
output did not increase their ability to implement rapid
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reforms. The tax administration system, inherited from the
socialist state, was unable to effectively collect taxes in
the changed free market environment. Implementing the West-
ern model also involved the risk of adopting a system de-
signed for different economic environments, where advanced
tax administration and modern accounting practices allow
fully implementing tax law.
2. Gradual Approach
Critics of rapid reforms favored a more gradual ap-
proach. They assumed there was no place for rapid liberali-
zation due to the absence of market and market-supporting
institutions. Instead of waiting on an “invisible hand of
the market” to correct the situation, they postulated an
active process of developing institutions and market infra-
structure. Without proper institutions, liberalized markets
would create the danger of monopolies by strong corpora-
tions that emerged from previous SOEs.
Some foreign advisors, recognizing institutional con-
straints, favored a more gradual, evolutionary approach to
reforming tax systems. Since standardizing tax systems
across transitional countries was unnecessary, each country
needed to develop a tax system allowing it to meet its spe-
cific needs (Bird, 1992; Wolf, 1999). Moreover, the newly
developed system needed to guarantee tax enforcement, de-
spite the inefficiency of the tax administration.
A gradual approach also involved some risks for the
transition process. Slow and continuous changes in the tax
system would decrease the stability and confidence required
to attract foreign investors. Furthermore, different inter-
ests groups would oppose implementing fundamental reforms,
which might slow down or even block transition.
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Central and Eastern European CITs inherited several
constraints decreasing their ability to move rapidly to-
wards a modern tax system. The lack of transparency, inter-
ventionist traditions and negotiable tax liabilities influ-
enced the tax administration resulting in its inability to
enforce taxes in the transitional environment. Inefficien-
cies in collecting taxes were accompanied by a decrease in
output as well as high inflation and unemployment, which
contributed to budget revenue problems.
With such a background, some foreign experts did not
advise completely adopting the Western tax system. Instead,
these experts favored a more gradual approach, which recog-
nized constraints facing particular countries.
Several countries moved quickly towards the Western
model of the tax system.14 However, since the tax systems
introduced in those countries were modeled on the tax sys-
tem existing in the European Union, each country adjusted
its system to reflect its individual country’s circum-
stances. On the other hand, reform of the tax policy was
not accompanied by reformed accounting systems nor modern-
ized tax administrations. In response, tax officials had to
face the challenges of using obsolete procedures.




IV – CURRENT TAX SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
A. INTRODUCTION
The process of transforming centrally planned econo-
mies to free market economies has been characterized by un-
even performance, to include the area of tax reform. The
pace and scope of tax reform has differed from country to
country, depending on the initial choices made by policy-
makers in the CITs. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
rapidly adopted Western-oriented tax systems, while coun-
tries like Belarus, Armenia and Tajikistan continue to
postpone reforming governmental institutions. Without mod-
ern and unpoliticized organizational structures, those
countries have problems in implementing advanced reform
programs.
The objective of the chapter is to evaluate the pro-
gress in reforming tax systems in CITs and ascertain the
impact of existing tax systems on economic performance in
transitional countries. Whether slow progress in reforming
tax systems has undermined economic growth is still largely
an unanswered question. To investigate this issue we have
developed an index of the tax reform effectiveness for 24
CITs covering the period from 1989 through 2000. By compar-
ing the index with the other development indicators, we
want to evaluate links between fiscal policy and the eco-
nomic performance of CITs.
To begin, we evaluate the general features of current
tax systems in CITs. Then we examine the development of tax
administration. We believe that this discussion is impor-
tant because many of CITs encountered several problems with
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tax law enforcement, tax evasion and underreporting, which
can be directly associated to the status of tax administra-
tion. Finally, we compare progress in reforming tax systems
with economic performance of CITs in order to assess the
importance of effective tax reform in the transition proc-
ess.
B. CURRENT SYSTEMS OF TAXATION
At the beginning of the transition process, the legacy
of planned socialism obscured the process of tax reform.
Moreover that process was hindered by uncertain positions
and policies of ministries of finance. This problem was
solved gradually as the ministries of finance took a lead-
ing role in creating fiscal policy.15
Additional problems arose with the perceived increase
in tax effort. As described in Chapter III, most taxes were
hidden from the population in CPEs. In such a situation,
implementing PITs created the impression of increased tax
burden on the population. Under these conditions, govern-
ments in CITs had difficulty in gaining popular support for
tax reforms.
1. Direct Taxation
Almost all CITs have based their tax system on three
pillars of modern systems of direct taxation: an enterprise
profit tax (EPT), an individual income tax, and a social
security or payroll tax.
a. Enterprise Profit Tax
In 1989, the first countries, which reformed
post-Soviet EPT, were Hungary and Poland. The process of
15 In CPEs fiscal policy was a part of the planning process.
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reforming this tax was considerably slowed by two major
factors. First, governments in CITs tried to use this tax
for promoting investment activities through tax holidays
and different tax rates. Second, the governments of these
CITs created a conflict with state enterprises by cutting
subsidies, decreasing protectionism,16 and restricting de-
ductible costs.
The EPT tax rates are moderate; comparable or of-
ten below Western tax systems. The highest rate is 40 per-
cent in the Slovak Republic and the lowest is 18 percent in
Hungary (World Bank, 2001; EBRD, 2001). Out of 24 Eastern
European and former Soviet Union CITs; ten have EPT rates
30 percent and higher. Nevertheless, the most recent trend
has been to lower the EPT rates.17 Even the highest tax rate
of 40 percent in the Slovak Republic is significantly lower
than the old enterprise tax rates in CPEs, which normally
ranged from 50 to 60 percent, sometimes amounting up to 100
percent or even more in some cases. In comparison, the EPT
rates in Western countries range from 28 percent in Canada
and Scandinavian countries, to 56 percent in Germany (Le-
nain & Bartoszuk, 2000).
At the beginning of transition, CITs mostly lim-
ited the use of deductions from enterprise revenues to pre-
serve the revenues generated by that tax in the previous
system. This norm was gradually reduced in the last dec-
ade;18 however, some countries still limit the deduction of
conventional expenses. Many of the CITs still try to en-
16 To include negotiation of tax liabilities and protection from
bankruptcy.
17 For example: Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and
Russia Federation (EBRD, 2000; EBRD, 2001).
18 For examples see Ebrill & Havrylyshyn (1999) and EBRD (2000).
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courage investments through tax holidays or preferential
tax rates; nevertheless, in many cases, governments have
attempted to reduce those incentives19 or even to completely
eliminate them.20
Another notable tax widely implemented at the be-
ginning of transition was the excess wage tax (EWT), which
widened the base of the standard EPT. This tax was imple-
mented to prevent managers from paying excessive wages and
to limit wage disparities. Although easy to administer,
EWTs discouraged innovation and productivity growth. For
that reason, the excess wage tax was abandoned by all the
CITs, except Belarus and Turkmenistan.
a. Personal Income Tax
Hungary was again the forerunner in reforming the
personal income tax (PIT) in 1988, followed by Lithuania in
1990, Latvia in 1991 and Poland in 1992 (EBRD, 2001). Most
of the other CITs reformed their systems in 1993 and 1994.
The inspiration for this process came from different
sources, such as International Monetary Fund and World
Bank, as well as Hussey and Lubick’s Basic World Tax Code
(1992). The most common tendency was to adopt PITs similar
to those existing in the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) and in the European Union (EU).
Countries aspiring for early access to the EU made the
strongest efforts in that process. Without strong and well
developed tax administration, however, such structures were
poorly executed. Some countries relied on a schedular
structure instead.
19 For example: Estonia, Russia, Slovenia, Armenia and Georgia (Eb-
rill & Havrylyshyn, 1999; EBRD, 2001).
20 For example: Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, the Ukraine, and
Latvia.
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Most of the CITs have a progressive tax rate
schedule. The trend over the transition has been to de-
crease the number of brackets towards a simpler three-
bracket structure. 21 Estonia, Russia and Turkmenistan, how-
ever, have only one bracket and Latvia, Moldova and Croatia
have two brackets. Additionally countries like Hungary and
Czech Republic still have six and five brackets, respec-
tively (Lenain & Bartoszuk, 2000). The common highest mar-
ginal rate is 40 percent, although the rate is as high as
50 percent in Slovenia and as low as 13 percent in Russia22
and 20 percent in Georgia. The latest trend is to lower the
highest marginal tax rate, for example from 40 to 35 per-
cent in Azerbaijan, from 40 to 38 percent in Bulgaria and
from 42 to 40 percent in Hungary (EBRD, 2000). In compari-
son, the highest marginal tax rate in Western countries
range from 13.2 percent in Switzerland to 60 percent in the
Netherlands (Lenain & Bartoszuk, 2000).
The tax base contains all types of labor income,
including bonuses, allowances and other forms of non-cash
incomes (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2001). Practically all
CITs exempt income from pensions, with some allowing joint
taxation of husband and wife, and additional deductions.
Recently some CITs imposed taxes on interest income, as a
remedy for revenue difficulties, like Poland in 2000.
c. Social Security Taxes
Payroll taxes or social security contributions
still generate a significant proportion of tax revenue in
CITs, amounting to 44 percent of revenue in the Czech Re-
21 For example Bulgaria lowered the number of brackets to 6 (Hassan &
Bogetic, 1997). Attempts to lower number of brackets started in Roma-
nia in 2000 (EBRD, 2000).
22 As a result of new tax code implemented in 1999 and 2000, effec-
tive January 2001 (EBRD, 2000).
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public (World Bank, 2001). From the beginning of the tran-
sition almost all CITs had social security funds exclu-
sively financed by the employer. That tendency was reduced
in some countries by incorporating partial financing by the
employee. Nevertheless, in most cases, employees’ contribu-
tions do not amount to more than 5 percent, except Latvia
with 9 percent of the wage employee contribution (Ebrill &
Havrylyshyn, 1999).
Another trend throughout the last few years has
been the reduction of the payroll tax rates. For example,
Poland reduced the payroll tax rate by 7.4 percentage
points, Georgia by 2 percentage points, Tajikistan by 8
percentage points and Ukraine by 3 percentage points. In
some cases this reduction was accompanied by an increase in
the employee’s contribution (Ebrill & Havrylyshyn, 1999;
Lenain & Bartoszuk, 2000).
The high marginal rate of the payroll tax in-
creases the cost of the labor in CITs, damaging the inter-
national competitiveness of transitional economies. More-
over, high labor costs reduce the amount of foreign invest-
ments in CITs. The social security system inherited from
CPEs has proven to be ineffective, thus providing incen-
tives for reforms, such as those recently attempted in such
countries like Poland in 1998, and Russia and Latvia in
2001 (EBRD, 2001).
2. Indirect Taxation
At the beginning of the transition process, CITs in-
herited complex turnover taxes from the previous system.
The policy-makers in Central European CITs faced two
choices: introducing retail sales taxes or value-added
taxes (VAT). Two main approaches are apparent in reforming
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the turnover tax. The first was an early introduction of
VAT, as in Hungary and post-Soviet Union countries. In the
second approach, many CITs simplified existing turnover
taxes to prepare for implementing a VAT in the future. In
other areas of indirect taxation, CITs enforced excise
taxes and taxes on international trade.
a. Value-added Tax (VAT)
The first countries implementing the VAT were
Hungary in 1988, and the former-Soviet Union countries in
1992. The next in line were the Czech Republic, Poland and
Romania, which introduced a VAT in 1993. At the present
time, all the CITs have implemented a VAT with the exemp-
tion of the FR Yugoslavia.23
All the post-Soviet Union countries adopted the
Soviet VAT model in 1992. This model, characterized by a
high single rate, was expected to generate approximately
the same revenue previously provided by the turnover tax.
Another commonly used feature of the Soviet VAT was using
the origin principle for trade within the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). Under the origin principle, ex-
ports were taxed and imports from other CIS countries were
not. Under the destination principle, commonly used in
other systems, imports from other countries are taxed,
while exports are exempt from the VAT.
The original Soviet VAT system was reformed
throughout the transition process, however with uneven re-
sults. Three important trends are recognizable in the tran-
sition process. First, countries like Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Ukraine, Moldova and Tajikistan tried to broaden tax cover-
age by eliminating or reducing exemptions (Ebrill &
23 Serbia plans to introduce VAT in 2003 (EBRD, 2001).
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Havrylyshyn, 1999). At the same time, even under the new
tax codes, a large number of exemptions still exist in some
countries. Second, some countries started switching from
the origin principle to the destination principle in trade
within the CIS. The first countries that broke rank were
Armenia and Moldova in 1997, and to some extent Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyz Republic and Georgia. Third, the original 28 percent
rate was lowered and at this time the common tax rate is 20
percent. Most of the CIS countries have maintained a single
VAT rate except Russia, Belarus and Uzbekistan.
The Central and Eastern European CITs opted for
adopting a VAT based on the EU model. The VAT rates are
similar to those in other Western European countries, which
are typically around 20 percent (Lenain & Bartoszuk, 2000).
The exception is Hungary with a 25 percent rate, making it
one of the highest rates in OECD. The general trend has
been to adopt a two-rate system, which allowed a lower num-
ber of exemptions and broader tax coverage than in the CIS
countries. Countries like Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia en-
forced a single rate VAT. Poland is the exception to this
tendency, with three rates. The attempt to reduce the num-
ber of rates from three to two was reversed in 2000, by in-
troducing a 3 percent rate on agricultural goods resulting
from access negotiations with the EU. Another feature dis-
tinguishing VAT systems in non-CIS CITs compared to CIS
CITs is the well defined level of business activity under
which businesses are not obliged to register under the VAT.
The VAT remains one of the most significant
sources of tax revenue for CITs generating more than 50
percent of the tax revenue in Moldova, Kyrgyz Republic, Ka-
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zakhstan and Georgia. In most cases, however, the revenue
ranges from 30 to 40 percent (World Bank, 2001).
b. Excise Taxes
Excise duties are usually charged on products
such as liquor, tobacco or motor fuels. In some CITs, other
activities like gambling or additional goods are also li-
able for excise taxes. All CITs adopted Western-style sepa-
rate excise taxes, however, these are usually below the EU
standards. Even though the EU standards require calculation
on an ad-valorem basis, most CITs switched to specific
rates as a countermeasure for tax evasion problems.
Recent reforms are aimed at reducing the number
of taxable goods and simplifying procedures. Moreover,
cross-border contraband forced the CITs to harmonize excise
tax rates between imported and domestic goods. This process
is moving slowly forward, and at this time half of CITs do
not have harmonized rates. In some countries, excise taxes
are adjusted frequently to meet perceived budgetary goals.
c. Custom Duties
Taxes on international trade were designed to
protect domestic markets from international competition.
The CIS countries initially adopted high tax rates with a
wide tax base dispersion compared to the other CITs. This
trend, however, was reversed in some countries, like
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Armenia. At the beginning of the
transition, many CITs introduced export duties that were
abandoned, in most cases, during the transition process.
Some countries, however, reinstated those duties in the
case of budgetary shortages. Import duties remained except
in Estonia, which abolished them in 1996, and in Turkmeni-
stan. The importance of custom duties decreased throughout
32
the transition process, especially in Central European and
Baltic CITs, which are at different stages in the EU acces-
sion negotiations process.
C. STATUS OF THE TAX ADMINISTRATION
While the governments of CITs quite easily implemented
new tax codes, nothing or very little was done to reform
tax administration. As a result, at the beginning of tran-
sition, tax administrations in CITs were unable to enforce
tax laws, resulting in a fall in tax revenue performance.
Several other factors influenced the slow and uneven pro-
gress in reforming tax administration, including highly
politicized administration, constant changes in the tax
law, obsolete accounting systems, the common use of non-
cash transactions, and the lack of well trained cadres.
Many CITs, aided by international organizations,
started several programs to improve tax administration.
Those reforms were focused on four areas:
• Implementing tax administration regulations to
adapt to the new market-oriented environment.
• Reforming managerial and organizational struc-
ture.
• Developing tax procedures and improving informa-
tion subsystems.
• Developing systems of tax law enforcement (Ebrill
& Havrylyshyn, 1999).
In recent years, several CITs introduced comprehensive
tax administration laws. Substantial progress has been made
in organizational reforms, taxpayer registration, and sanc-
tions and penalties. The most recent attempts to reform tax
administration occurred in Azerbaijan (2000), Albania
(2001), and Georgia (2001) (EBRD, 2001). Despite these at-
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tempts, several inefficiencies have remained and require
additional reform.
From the beginning of the transition process, all the
CITs encountered falling tax revenues. At present, many
CITs, especially in Central Europe and the Baltic States,
seem to have improved revenue performance when compared to
the mid-nineties. On the other hand, many CIS countries,
especially in Asia and the Caucasus region, generate tax
revenue well below 20 percent of GDP (EBRD, 2001).24 Details
of tax revenue performance are presented in Table 1.
Poor progress in tax revenue can be associated not
only with tax administration but also economic factors,
such as a general fall in output at the beginning of the
transition. This partially explains the fall in tax reve-
nues. Moreover, rapid and frequent changes in the tax law
confused administrators and taxpayers. In many cases, new
taxes were introduced without proper preparation of the tax
administration, decreasing their ability to enforce the new
law.
Almost all CITs encountered growing problems of tax
evasion. This problem can be associated with several fac-
tors, including:
• Unclear tax laws;
• Lack of tradition of voluntary compliance;
• Distrust of governmental institutions, inherited
from the previous system;
• Corruption of the tax administration; and
• Arbitrary tax enforcement.
24 For example: Tajikistan – 12.9%, Georgia – 14.0%, Azerbaijan –
14.5% (EBRD, 2001)
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Poorly developed, or in some cases non-existent, tax-
payers services and the tradition of the tax administrator
helping fill out and review tax returns, spread the scarce
tax administration resources, increasing the administrative
and compliance cost.
The organizational structure of the tax administration
has also generated problems in implementing tax policy.
There is no clear distinction between the roles and respon-
sibilities of local and central authorities, which has made
it easier for local authorities to influence tax adminis-
trators. In some cases, CITs developed a tax policy to im-
prove tax law enforcement. However, without a clear dis-
tinction of responsibilities and with parallel organiza-
tions, tax policy often duplicates the role of tax admini-
stration, increasing the perception of arbitrary enforce-
ment. In many CITs, tax administration still is organized
along type of taxpayer or type of tax rather than by func-
tions or along large taxpayers units.25 This situation often
creates conflicting responsibilities.
Most CITs have made only marginal progress in reform-
ing auditing processes. As a result, field offices do not
have clear plans of audits with a limited number of audi-
tors performing that task. Without modern, analytical meth-
ods for selecting taxpayers to audit based on their compli-
ance history, offices audit each taxpayer in the same time
interval. With scarce resources, offices are unable to
track unreported activities, thus they focus rather on re-
viewing reported incomes. As a result, gains from that pro-
25 Large taxpayer units are a type of division of tax administration
where each unit is responsible for all aspects of activities including
audit, collection and enforcement for taxpayers representing tax reve-
nues over certain threshold (Ebrill & Havrylyshyn, 1999)
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cedure are insignificant while the cost of conducting au-
dits and loss of unreported revenues increase.
Tax administrations in CITs still have problems deter-
ring increasing tax arrears. The most common procedure is
to issue payment orders instead of seizure and sale of
property, settlements and installment. For that reason, tax
arrears in some countries exceed 20 percent of the GDP, de-
spite established institutions designed to countermeasure
such situations, like the Creditor’s Council in Moldova
(EBRD, 2001). In some cases, even if administrators have
appropriate tools to fight tax arrears, they do not use
them (Ebrill & Havrylyshyn, 1999).
D. IMPACT OF TAX REFORM ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
The choice of the tax structure and tax policy influ-
ence several economic decisions. Too high tax rates and
frequently changing tax policy create an unstable invest-
ment environment resulting in a lower level of investment
and new economic activities. However, largely unanswered is
the question whether it is possible to directly link the
progress in reforming the tax system with overall economic
performance.
To examine the influence of the tax reform on economic
growth, we construct an index of tax reform effectiveness
for 24 CITs. As a time framework for developing this index,
we cover the transition period from 1989 through 2000. Com-
paring the tax reform index with economic development indi-
cators, we attempt to identify the influence tax reform has
on the economic performance of CITs.
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The index, while subjective, can provide some insight
into the impact of tax reform on the process of economic
transition. Being aware of data availability and the sub-
jectivity of our estimates, we recommend that findings in
this section should not be directly transformed to situa-
tions in individual countries, but rather interpreted as
general trends and patterns.
The overall tax reform index is calculated from six
measures of tax reform effectiveness. Each of those meas-
ures has been given a score ranging from zero, for most ef-
fective, to three, for least effective.
Constructing the index we used the following measures:
• Timing of the Tax Reform – the period of time
from the start of the transition process to the
implementation of a tax reform program that in-
cluded a modern VAT;
• Preparation for the Tax Reform – the average pe-
riod of time given for preparing legislation and
implementation;
• Stability of the Tax System – the frequency of
changes in the tax laws since the initial reform
program;
• Tax rates – a deviation of the maximum rates for
the primary revenue sources from the average
maximum rate for the primary revenue sources of
all CITs;26
• Existence and range of Tax Holidays – the sig-
nificance of special treatments and exemptions
used to guide the economic activities;
• Effectiveness of Tax Administration – revenue
generated by taxes as a percent of the GDP.
The scores from all measures generate a “cumulative
reform index” (CRI), which is the sum of all scores. Based
26 This include: VAT, Enterprise Profit Tax and Social security con-
tributions
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on CRI, we group CITs in four categories from “advanced tax
reformers” to “slow tax reformers,” assigning to each group
a single score from zero to three – “overall reform index”
(ORI).
The possible empirical linkage between progress in the
tax reform and economic performance is explored in Table 2,
where we list several economic indicators comparing them
with the tax reform index. The general trend is that with
minor exceptions “advanced” and “high intermediate” tax re-
formers perform significantly better then “low intermedi-
ate” and “slow” reformers. Foreign direct investment as a
percent of the GDP is generally higher in the “high inter-
mediate” and “low intermediate.” The correlation coeffi-
cient between the tax reform index (CRI) and foreign direct
investment as a percent of the GDP takes expected sign and
is statistically significant at the 40 percent level (The
correlation coefficients of CRI with foreign direct invest-
ments and other development indicators are presented in Ta-
ble 3). In recent years, some of the “advanced” reformers
noted a significant fall in foreign investments as a per-
cent of the GDP. For example, in Hungary this fall ranged
from 10 percent in 1995 to 2.6 percent in 2000; in Estonia
from 11.2 percent (1998) to 6.4 percent (2000) and in Lat-
via from 9.2 percent to 5.6 percent. This situation can be
explained by improvements in the tax law, resulting in
elimination of tax holidays and exemptions, which were
mainly focused on attracting foreign investors. On the
other hand, a relatively high level of foreign investments
in case of “low intermediate” reformers may have two expla-
nations: first, close links to neighboring countries, espe-
cially in case of CIS countries, like Moldova, Armenia and
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Georgia; the second, still present strong tax incentives to
attract investors.
The overall performance of CITs, as measured by annual
inflation and growth in the GDP, appears to be on average
better among “advanced” and “high intermediate” tax reform-
ers. Higher average inflation in “high intermediate” group
comparing to “low intermediate” is result of 45.7 percent
inflation in Romania (Table 2). Excluding that country, av-
erage inflation in “high intermediate” group is 6 percent,
which is significantly lower than in “lower intermediate”
group. The correlation coefficient between the tax reform
index (CRI) and the average annual growth is negative. This
suggests that slower reformers grew slower over time.
“Low intermediate” and “slow” tax reformers are still
not able to recover from the fall in GDP that took place at
the beginning of the transition process. The only exception
in that trend is Albania, which was able to maintain an av-
erage 2.2 percent growth of the GDP throughout transition
process. At this moment, Albania is one of five countries,
which reached or even exceeded the level of its GDP from
1989. The correlation coefficient between the tax reform
index (CRI) and the level of the GDP in 2000 compared to
the level of the GDP in 1989 is negative at the 34 percent
level. This suggests that countries that made slower pro-
gress in reforming their tax systems slower recovered from
the fall of the GDP during the transition.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
While significant progress in reforming tax systems
has been made, many aspects of reforms lag behind, hinder-
39
ing the overall tax revenue performance in CITs. We believe
that poor progress in reforming tax systems in CITs has
significantly influenced economic growth in those coun-
tries. On the other hand, “advanced tax reformers” perform
better and have recovered faster from transitional distor-
tions.
Most of the CITs have adopted three pillars of modern
systems of direct taxation: the EPT, PIT and social secu-
rity taxes. Moderate EPT tax rates and eliminating EWT is
on the positive side of the transition process. On the
other hand, high rates of social security taxes with small
share of employees’ contributions create additional burdens
on businesses, decreasing their competitiveness.
The reform of indirect taxation has been characterized
by uneven performance. Most CIS countries still maintain
the obsolete VAT. Moreover, unharmonized excise taxes be-
tween imported and domestic goods increase problems with
cross-border contraband, especially from the former Soviet
Union. Governments of CITs still maintain protectionism of
domestic markets through high tariffs.
While progress in changing tax laws was rather smooth
and fast, very little was done so far in improving tax ad-
ministration. Obsolete accounting systems, underdeveloped
taxpayer services, archaic audit plans and not clear or-
ganization, undermined progress in reforming tax systems.
As a result, most of the CITs encountered problems of tax
evasion and tax arrears.
We recognize that effective tax reform in CITs was ac-
companied by overall liberalization, stabilization, priva-
tization and legislative reforms. After all, tax reform is
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only part of a broader reform package. We believe, however,
that even partial analysis can provide useful information







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































V – LESSONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The progress of transforming tax systems in CITs dif-
fers significantly, especially between “advanced” and
“slow” tax reformers. The transitional strategies imple-
mented by tax reformers range from the case of Estonia,
which adopted a modern tax structure in 1994 and maintained
it throughout transition period without significant
changes; to Belarus, which still preserves a tax system
mainly inherited from the former Soviet Union. Belarus,
along with maintaining this old system, continuously
changes tax laws to meet budgetary needs. Despite these
differences in tax reform strategies, several general les-
sons can be drawn from the transition process.
The main objective of this chapter is to extract gen-
eral lessons from the transition process in CITs. We be-
lieve that the lessons from the past can provide insight
into the direction for future reform and identify possible
problems that could undermine process of tax reform in the
following years. We first evaluate the lessons learned from
the experience of reforming tax systems in CITs. Based on
this analysis, we recommend changes for consideration on
the scope and pace of reforms.
B. LESSONS FROM TRANSFORMING TAX SYSTEMS
We believe, that despite a wide diversity of transi-
tional policies and strategies, the general lessons from
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transforming tax systems in CITs can be grouped in the five
following areas.
1. Initial Conditions
At the beginning of the transition process each of the
CITs inherited a tax system from the previous socialist
system. In the CPEs, the private sector was insignificant
or non-existent. With the absence of well-defined markets,
prices did not significantly influence the allocation of
resources. A large, subsidized and ineffective state sector
consumed most, if not all, of state revenues. The tax sys-
tems and, especially, tax administrations of the CPEs were
unprepared to operate in the transitional environment.
The Central European countries were in a more favor-
able position relative to the countries emerging from the
collapse of the former Soviet Union. First, on average, the
private sector was larger in the Central European countries
than in the Soviet Union. Second, some countries, like Hun-
gary and Poland, had already started the selective reform
of state enterprises and procedures, with the intent of
transforming their economies into “market socialism.”
The legacy of CPE tax systems played an important role
in hindering the process of reform and influencing the
choices made by policy-makers. Tax systems in CPEs were
primarily used by the state to influence economic deci-
sions. The revenue-raising purpose of taxes was not as im-
portant as profits could be extracted from SOEs through a
variety of means other than taxation. Examples of the CPEs
legacy haunting transitional economies include: an underde-
veloped tax administration; the lack of transparency in tax
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systems; and the lack of a tradition of voluntary compli-
ance that created problems of tax evasion.
The tradition of state interventionism has created ad-
ditional problems. Many CITs still use tax systems to pro-
mote certain economic activities through tax holidays and
preferential tax rates. This results in a perception of
inequality and lack of fairness in tax systems, which hin-
ders economic activity.
2. Tax Law Enforcement
In the CPEs, tax administrators dealt with a rela-
tively small number of taxpayers. The centralization of the
banking system, administratively-imposed prices for produc-
tive inputs and outputs and the lack of tax deductible
costs eased audits, allowing the control of cash flows in
the economy. Negotiable tax liabilities and the dependence
on personal judgment undermined common trust in governmen-
tal institutions, creating a tradition of tax evasion.
While most of the CITs easily adopted new tax codes,
very little was done in adjusting tax administrations to
the new market-oriented environment. Without the ability to
enforce new tax laws, the simple adoption of new rules did
not provide expected outcomes. As a result, tax revenues
fell, primarily due to tax evasion and increasing tax ar-
rears.
Tax administrations in many CITs still lack modern
programs for registering, collecting and auditing. More-
over, the organizational structure of many tax administra-
tions is not functional, which spreads the scarce resources
of tax offices. The constant problem of lack of sufficient
resources decreases the ability of tax administrations to
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develop quickly, restructure, and attract well-trained cad-
res.
3. Lack Of Stability
Many CITs were unable to prepare comprehensive pro-
grams of reforming tax systems at the beginning of the
transition. Pressure from the population to reform forced
policy-makers to adopt ad-hoc programs, without systematic
evaluation of future performance. As a result, many reforms
did not comply with standard objectives of the modern tax
systems, including equity, economic neutrality and simplic-
ity.
In most cases, these ad-hoc tax codes created ineffi-
ciencies and loopholes resulting in confusion among tax ad-
ministrators and taxpayers, while simultaneously increasing
the scale of tax evasion. Attempts to eliminate ambiguities
only increased the complexity of the tax systems. In the
case of year-by-year adjustments in tax laws, domestic and
foreign investors were unwilling to undertake significant
new investments.
During election campaigns, pressures from different
groups often facilitated unprepared and administratively
unfeasible programs. In case of repeated changes in power,
the temptation to abandon programs, which were implemented
by predecessors from different political group, arose, thus
increasing the pace of changes in the tax system.
Tax systems in CITs, for the most part, still lack
stability in the tax structure and tax institutions. The
constant changes in tax laws increases administrative and
compliance costs, creating incentives for tax evasion and
insufficient tax revenues. In some countries, which tried
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to adapt tax systems to their unique transitional environ-
ment, pressures from the expenditure side of the budget in-
creased pace of continuous changes in tax laws. These
changes created even more instability and ambiguity into
the transition process.
4. Support Of Other Reforms
Tax reforms cannot improve overall economic perform-
ance without support from other reforms. These reforms in-
clude the enforcement of bankruptcy laws, concessions, se-
cured transactions and financial regulations, such as ac-
counting systems. The CITs that rapidly restructured their
economic, political and legal systems, apparently performed
better than countries that slowed implementation of broad
reforms.27
5. Structure Of The Tax System
In most CITs, the structure of tax systems still needs
adjustment. Social security taxes with large employer
contribution increase labor costs, decreasing
competitiveness of local enterprises opened to foreign
markets. Very little has been done to increase employees’
contributions or to change the pension system. At present,
most CITs maintain pension systems inherited from CPEs;
only in a few cases, have governments introduced a system
based on personal savings28 rather than traditional social
security tax used to finance a pay-as-you-go system.
However, the transitional period requires maintaining state
funded social security systems to finance people who are
already pensioners or those with remaining work time is
27 For detailed comparisons see: EBRD (2000).
28 For example Poland in 1999, Bulgaria and Latvia in 2001, Croatia
and Russia in 2002 (EBRD, 2001)
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those with remaining work time is insufficient to generate
adequate savings.
In many cases, especially in the CIS countries, gov-
ernments continue to maintain an obsolete VAT system. In
these systems, the origin principle, the narrow taxable
base, unclear taxpayer registration procedures and outdated
accounting methods decrease the ability to control taxable
incomes, therefore creating tax evasion problems.
Personal income taxes, in many cases, give too many
debatable income deductions and tax credits. As a result,
only the wealthiest taxpayers can benefit from such exemp-
tions. Constant changes in the tax code, poorly prepared
modifications and poorly developed taxpayers’ services have
a regressive impact on income distribution. In such a case,
perceived inequity in the system creates distortions and
raises the “gray zone” in the economy.
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Regardless that the process of transition has lasted
over one decade, many CITs appear not to have internalized
lessons from the experience of other CITs or from experi-
ences of Western countries. Consequently, in such cases,
CITs have followed the same pattern of mistakes, which re-
sulted in complicated and ad-hoc adjusted tax systems. In
the following paragraphs we list our recommendations
grouped into six areas.
1. Reconstruction Of The Tax Structure
Decreased social security tax rates would reduce the
tax wedge and improve competitiveness, giving incentives
for creating new workplaces. Widening the tax base should
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offset losses from lowered tax rates. Additionally, elimi-
nating existing loopholes and introducing a more realistic
assessment of social security contributions from the self-
employed29 would increase tax revenues.
Eliminating exemptions from the VAT would increase tax
revenues and facilitate the decrease of an unofficial econ-
omy. This would affect areas currently exempt from VAT or
subject to reduced tax rates, such as building materials,
new apartments, products for children, books, magazines,
legal and cultural services. A wider tax base would allow a
reducing standard tax rate. CIS countries should shift to-
wards the destination principle of VAT instead of maintain-
ing the origin principle.
Several CITs still have not harmonized excise tax
rates between domestic and foreign goods, which result in
an increasing problem of contraband. Use of excise taxes
should be limited to a few specific goods, which is similar
to practices in Western countries. Moreover, CITs should
move towards calculating on an ad-valorem basis, especially
those aspiring to early accession to the EU.
2. Improvement Of Tax Administration
The tax law is as good as the enforcement of the tax
law. To start with, CITs should revise and re-write unclear
parts of tax codes in close cooperation with groups of tax-
payers. After that revision, tax laws could avoid imprecise
and vague situations, which would decrease possibility of
arbitrary decisions and the temptation of bribery. Tax ser-
29 In many cases social security contributions from self-employed are
calculated on the existing low presumed income rather than on actual
income.
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vices should be organized alongside functional lines, thus
decreasing the possibility of duplicated responsibilities.
Use of modern information technology, improved ac-
counting systems and precise annual audit plans would in-
crease the effectiveness of the tax administration. With
these tools, the tax administration would be able to track
unreported incomes and prevent tax arrears. Very useful in
that process would be elimination of tax offsets, barters
and other non-cash payments.
3. Simplification Of Tax Codes
Simplified tax codes would increase transparency in
the tax system. A lower number of brackets in PIT and EPT
and a lower number of exemptions would widen the tax base
and increase tax revenue. Moreover, by eliminating special
treatments, preferential tax rates and tax holidays tax
systems would be clearer while horizontally and vertically
equal. In such situations, enterprises could start making
decisions based on economic factors instead of on fiscal
opportunities.
4. Consensus Around Tax Reform
The governments of CITs should prepare long-range
plans of tax reform built on a consensus of all major po-
litical forces. These plans should include specific goals
and objectives with the means to achieve them. Implementing
reforms in all areas as quickly as possible would be most
favorable. However, with the permanent scarcity of re-
sources in transitional economies, plans should prioritize
specific areas that include sequencing of reforms.
Nation-wide consensus around reforms would increase
stability and reduce the temptation of changing tax policy
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with every change in power. In such situation, alternate
tax policies will be appropriately prepared and analyzed in
case of their potential effects on revenues and tax burden
distribution.
The governments of CITs should calculate and publish
tax expenditure budgets. Identified costs created by losses
of tax revenues from exemptions, tax evasion and tax cred-
its would increase public awareness of revenue shortfalls.
This strengthens support for tax reforms while building a
culture of voluntary compliance.
The reform of tax systems should be accompanied by
other reforms. Without clear and modern accounting stan-
dards, banking laws, and bankruptcy laws, framing effective
tax systems is difficult.
D. SUMMARY
Reforming tax systems inherited from CPEs is one of
the significant challenges facing CITs. Without clear and
simple tax systems, tax revenue declined, while governments
faced increased demands from the expenditure side of the
business.
Analyzing the process of transition we have found that
the “advanced” tax reformers recover faster comparing to
“slow” tax reformers. We are aware, however, that tax re-
form cannot influence the economy alone without support of
liberalization of markets, rationalization of economic
policies, privatization, and legal reforms.
On the other hand, interventionist traditions, which
use taxes to guide and promote specific economic activi-
ties, the lack of voluntary compliance, the lack of trans-
54
parency and little progress in reforming tax administration
destabilize fiscal systems. As a result, transitional dis-
tortions undermine state trustworthiness, create budget
deficits, discourage investors and increase social costs of
reforms.
In many cases CITs have made significant progress in
reforming their tax systems. On the other hand, even within
the most advanced tax reformers, several areas require at-
tention and feasible and achievable plans for the future.
The immediate future will show, which countries are able to
accelerate their reforms and access the EU, or, in case of
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